What are Credit Default Swaps?

Unregulated Insurance Policies for Risky, Toxic Investments

Trading a protection policy, designed by mathematicians and physicists, purchased from a seller in order to protect the value of a financial investment, is called a Credit Default Swap (CDS). It appears to be an insurance policy purchased to protect the value of an asset; however, a swap is not regulated insurance. Law professor and former director of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission Dr. Michael Greenberger, told 60 Minutes correspondent Steve Kroft on October 5th 2008; "A credit default swap….is an insurance contract, but they've been very careful not to call it that because if it were insurance, it would be regulated. So they use a magic substitute word called a 'swap'….”

Insurance regulations require reserve capital to pay the insured. Professor of Economics and Law, Dr. William K. Black, author of the best selling book The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One; said during congressional testimony on October 14th 2008 that these derivatives were “casino investing.” While “…hedging and futures trading is an integral part of financial markets…swaps have circumnavigated the regulators.”

On March 4th 2003, the BBC reported that legendary investor Warren Buffet said, “the derivatives market has exploded…with these investments to…manage market risk…” Buffet argued they “…are time bombs and financial weapons of mass destruction that could harm…the whole economic system.”

History

New to investing, the first swaps were sold in 1987 in the form of Interest Rate (IR) and Cross Currency (CC) swaps. Credit Default and Equity Swaps joined the Swap market in the first quarter of 2001 and 2002 respectively.

The total outstanding value of all IR and CC swaps was $29 trillion by 1997. The first Credit Default Swaps totaled $631 billion but by the first quarter of 2008 the 4 types of Swaps (IR, CC, Equity and Credit Default) exploded to $531.2 trillion!

Problem

The data indicates that the unregulated and under-capitalized swap market, influenced by the housing bubble, exasperated the CDS products throughout the financial and banking system.

Alan Zibel, AP business writer, reported on September 5th 2008, “a record 9% of American homeowners with a mortgage -- were either behind on their payments or in foreclosure.” Syndicated writer Peter Miller wrote on 9/23 in Realty Trac, “some 2.5 million homes are…in the ‘process of foreclosure’… the total value of such mortgages would be $440 billion.”

The Bank for International Settlements estimated the value of these swaps as $45 trillion by the end of 2008. Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, testified before Congress on 9/23/08 that the national CDS market was “$58 trillion.” However, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association estimated the CDS value at $62.2 trillion at the end of 2007. Frank Partnoy, a derivatives broker and law professor argued on 60 Minutes, “It's sort of alarming that…we don't even know how big [the CDS market] is to within, say, $10 trillion."

With a value of $45 – $62 trillion the swaps are 4 times the annual GDP of the United States (13.8 trillion in 2007.) While it is agreed that the default value of these swaps is far below their notional value, the default swap ratio to the default mortgage value is still highly skewed.

Aline van Duyn wrote on October 1st in the Financial Times that in, “the credit derivatives market…because of the opacity of this market, it is still not clear how many contracts have to be settled….” Shannon Harrington wrote in Bloomberg.com, “Barclays' analysts estimated…that [if] $2 trillion in credit-default swaps…were to fail, it might trigger $57 billion in losses.” This 2.9% ratio, extrapolated over the total outstanding CDS would lead to $1.8 trillion write-off. The direct CDS losses are 4 times higher than the total value of the housing losses.

Dr. Greenberger put it best, “…there is much more…this is only the tip....”   Original Article




Muffled Signals


                         


The financial crisis has put a spotlight on the obscure world of credit default swaps - which trade in a vast,
unregulated market that most people haven’t heard of and even fewer understand. Will this be the next disaster?




In just over a decade these privately traded derivatives contracts have ballooned from nothing into a $54.6 trillion market. CDS are the fastest-growing major type of financial derivatives. More important, they’ve played a critical role in the unfolding financial crisis. First, by ostensibly providing “insurance” on risky mortgage bonds, they encouraged and enabled reckless behavior during the housing bubble.

“If CDS had been taken out of play, companies would’ve said, ‘I can’t get this [risk] off my books,’” says Michael Greenberger, a University of Maryland law professor and former director of trading and markets at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. “If they couldn’t keep passing the risk down the line, those guys would’ve been stopped in their tracks. The ultimate assurance for issuing all this stuff was, ‘It’s insured.’”

Second, terror at the potential for a financial Ebola virus radiating out from a failing institution and infecting dozens or hundreds of other companies - all linked to one another by CDS and other instruments - was a major reason that regulators stepped in to bail out Bear Stearns and buy out AIG (AIG, Fortune 500), whose calamitous descent itself was triggered by losses on its CDS contracts (see “Hank’s Last Stand”).

“The big problem is that here are all these public companies - banks and corporations - and no one really knows what exposure they’ve got from the CDS contracts,” says Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and former Morgan Stanley derivatives salesman who has been writing about the dangers of CDS and their ilk for a decade. “The really scary part is that we don’t have a clue.” Chris Wolf, a co-manager of Cogo Wolf, a hedge fund of funds, compares them to one of the great mysteries of astrophysics: “This has become essentially the dark matter of the financial universe.”

At first glance, credit default swaps don’t look all that scary. A CDS is just a contract: The “buyer” plunks down something that resembles a premium, and the “seller” agrees to make a specific payment if a particular event, such as a bond default, occurs. Used soberly, CDS offer concrete benefits: If you’re holding bonds and you’re worried that the issuer won’t be able to pay, buying CDS should cover your loss. “CDS serve a very useful function of allowing financial markets to efficiently transfer credit risk,” argues Sunil Hirani, the CEO of Creditex, one of a handful of marketplaces that trade the contracts.

Because they’re contracts rather than securities or insurance, CDS are easy to create: Often deals are done in a one-minute phone conversation or an instant message. Many technical aspects of CDS, such as the typical five-year term, have been standardized by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). That only accelerates the process. You strike your deal, fill out some forms, and you’ve got yourself a $5 million - or a $100 million - contract.

And as long as someone is willing to take the other side of the proposition, a CDS can cover just about anything, making it the Wall Street equivalent of those notorious Lloyds of London policies covering Liberace’s hands and other esoterica. It has even become possible to purchase a CDS that would pay out if the U.S. government defaults. (Trust us when we say that if the government goes under, trying to collect will be the least of your worries.)

You can guess how Wall Street cowboys responded to the opportunity to make deals that (1) can be struck in a minute, (2) require little or no cash upfront, and (3) can cover anything. Yee-haw! You can almost picture Slim Pickens in Dr. Strangelove climbing onto the H-bomb before it’s released from the B-52. And indeed, the volume of CDS has exploded with nuclear force, nearly doubling every year since 2001 to reach a recent peak of $62 trillion at the end of 2007, before receding to $54.6 trillion as of June 30, according to ISDA.

Take that gargantuan number with a grain of salt. It refers to the face value of all outstanding contracts. But many players in the market hold offsetting positions. So if, in theory, every entity that owns CDS had to settle its contracts tomorrow and “netted” all its positions against each other, a much smaller amount of money would change hands. But even a tiny fraction of that $54.6 trillion would still be a daunting sum.

The credit freeze and then the Bear disaster explain the drop in outstanding CDS contracts during the first half of the year - and the market has only worsened since. CDS contracts on widely held debt, such as General Motors’ (GM, Fortune 500), continue to be actively bought and sold. But traders say almost no new contracts are being written on any but the most liquid debt issues right now, in part because nobody wants to put money at risk and because nobody knows what Washington will do and how that will affect the market. (”There’s nothing to do but watch Bernanke on TV,” one trader told Fortune during the week when the Fed chairman was going before Congress to push the mortgage bailout.) So, after nearly a decade of exponential growth, the CDS market is poised for its first sustained contraction.



One reason the market took off is that you don’t have to own a bond to buy a CDS on it - anyone can place a bet on whether a bond will fail. Indeed the majority of CDS now consists of bets on other people’s debt. That’s why it’s possible for the market to be so big: The $54.6 trillion in CDS contracts completely dwarfs total corporate debt, which the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association puts at $6.2 trillion, and the $10 trillion it counts in all forms of asset-backed debt.

“It’s sort of like I think you’re a bad driver and you’re going to crash your car,” says Greenberger, formerly of the CFTC. “So I go to an insurance company and get collision insurance on your car because I think it’ll crash and I’ll collect on it.” That’s precisely what the biggest winners in the subprime debacle did. Hedge fund star John Paulson of Paulson & Co., for example, made $15 billion in 2007, largely by using CDS to bet that other investors’ subprime mortgage bonds would default.

So what started out as a vehicle for hedging ended up giving investors a cheap, easy way to wager on almost any event in the credit markets. In effect, credit default swaps became the world’s largest casino. As Christopher Whalen, a managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, observes, “To be generous, you could call it an unregulated, uncapitalized insurance market. But really, you would call it a gaming contract.”
There is at least one key difference between casino gambling and CDS trading: Gambling has strict government regulation. The federal government has long shied away from any oversight of CDS. The CFTC floated the idea of taking an oversight role in the late ’90s, only to find itself opposed by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others. Then, in 2000, Congress, with the support of Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, passed a bill prohibiting all federal and most state regulation of CDS and other derivatives. In a press release at the time, co-sponsor Senator Phil Gramm - most recently in the news when he stepped down as John McCain’s campaign co-chair this summer after calling people who talk about a recession “whiners” - crowed that the new law “protects financial institutions from over-regulation … and it guarantees that the United States will maintain its global dominance of financial markets.” (The authors of the legislation were so bent on warding off regulation that they had the bill specify that it would “supersede and preempt the application of any state or local law that prohibits gaming …”) Not everyone was as sanguine as Gramm. In 2003 Warren Buffett famously called derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction.”

There’s another big difference between trading CDS and casino gambling. When you put $10 on black 22, you’re pretty sure the casino will pay off if you win. The CDS market offers no such assurance. One reason the market grew so quickly was that hedge funds poured in, sensing easy money. And not just big, well-established hedge funds but a lot of upstarts. So in some cases, giant financial institutions were counting on collecting money from institutions only slightly more solvent than your average minimart. The danger, of course, is that if a hedge fund suddenly has to pay off on a lot of CDS, it will simply go out of business. “People have been insuring risks that they can’t insure,” says Peter Schiff, the president of Euro Pacific Capital and author of Crash Proof, which predicted doom for Fannie and Freddie, among other things. “Let’s say you’re writing fire insurance policies, and every time you get the [premium], you spend it. You just assume that no houses are going to burn down. And all of a sudden there’s a huge fire and they all burn down. What do you do? You just close up shop.”This is not an academic concern. Wachovia (WB, Fortune 500) and Citigroup (C, Fortune 500) are wrangling in court with a $50 million hedge fund located in the Channel Islands. The reason: A dispute over two $10 million credit default swaps covering some CDOs. The specifics of the spat aren’t important. What’s most revealing is that these massive banks put their faith in a Lilliputian fund (in an inaccessible jurisdiction) that was risking 40% of its capital for just two CDS. Can anyone imagine that Citi would, say, insure its headquarters building with a thinly capitalized, unregulated, offshore entity?

That’s one element of what’s known as “counterparty risk.” Here’s another: In many cases, you don’t even know who has the other side of your bet. Parties to the contract can, and do, transfer their side of the contract to third parties. Investment firms assert that transfers are well documented (a claim that, like most in the world of CDS, is impossible to verify). But even if that’s true, you’re still left with the fact that a given company’s risks are being dispersed in ways that they may not know about and can’t control.

It doesn’t help that CDS trading is a haphazard process. Most contracts are bought and sold over the phone or by instant message and settled manually. Settlement has been sloppy, confirms Jamie Cawley of IDX Capital, a firm that brokers trades between big banks. Pushed by New York Fed president Timothy Geithner, the players have been improving the process. But even as recently as a year ago, Cawley says, so many trades were sitting around unfulfilled that “there were $1 trillion worth of swaps that were unsettled among counterparties.”

Trade settlement is not the only anachronistic aspect of CDS trading. Consider what will happen with CDS contracts relating to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The two were placed in conservatorship on Sept. 7. But the value of many contracts won’t be determined till Oct. 6, when an auction will set a cash price for Fannie and Freddie bonds. We’ll spare you the technical reasons, but suffice it to ask: Can you imagine any other major market that would need a month to resolve something like this?

With Washington suddenly in a frenzy of outrage over the financial markets, debating everything from the shape and extent of the mortgage plan to what should be done about short-selling, the future for CDS is very blurry. “The market is here to stay,” asserts Cawley. The question is simply: What sorts of changes are in store? As this article was going to press, SEC chairman Christopher Cox asked the Senate to allow his agency to begin regulating CDS - mostly, it should be said, to rein in short-selling. And the SEC separately announced that it was expanding its investigation of market manipulation, which initially targeted the short-sellers, to CDS investors.

Under other circumstances, Cox’s request might have been met with polite silence. But the convulsions over the mortgage bailout are so dramatic that they are reminiscent of the moment, soon after the Enron scandal, when Congress drafted the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. The desire to blame short-sellers may actually result in powers for Cox that, until very recently, he showed no signs of wanting. Should legislators wade into this issue, the measures most widely seen as necessary are straightforward: some form of centralized trading or clearing and some form of capital or reserve requirements. Meanwhile, New York State’s insurance commissioner, Eric Dinallo, announced new regulations that would essentially treat sellers of some (but not all) CDS as insurance entities, thereby forcing them to set aside reserves and otherwise follow state insurance law - requirements that would probably drive many participants from the market. Whether CDS players will find a way to challenge the rules remains to be seen. (ISDA, the industry’s trade group, has already gone on record in opposition to Cox’s proposal.) If nothing else, the New York law may provide additional impetus for the feds to take action.

For now, the biggest impact could come from the Financial Accounting Standards Board. It is implementing a new rule in November that will require sellers of CDS and other credit derivatives to report detailed information, including their maximum payouts and reasons for entering the contracts, as well as assets that might allow them to offset any payouts. Anybody who has tried to parse CEO compensation in recent years knows that more disclosure doesn’t guarantee clarity, but any increase in information in the CDS realm will be a benefit. Perhaps that would limit the baleful effect of CDS on (must we consider it?) the next disaster - or even help us prevent it.

Links:

SEC Files Credit Default Swaps Insider Trading Case

Unregulated  Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness

Credit Default Swaps: The Poison in the Financial System

Modern Money Mechanics



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Saturday, September 08, 2007
The 300 Year Old Ponzi Scheme

Panic struck on Wall Street, as the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged a thousand points between July and August, and commentators warned of a 1929-style crash. To prevent that dire result, the U.S. Federal Reserve, along with the central banks of Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan, extended a 315 billion dollar lifeline to troubled banks and investment firms. The hemorrhage stopped, the markets turned around, and investors breathed a sigh of relief. All was well again in Stepfordville. Or was it? And if it was, at what cost? Three hundred billion dollars is about a third of the total paid by U.S. taxpayers in personal income taxes annually. A mere $188 billion would have been enough to repair all of the 74,000 U.S. bridges known to be defective, preventing another disaster like that in Minneapolis in July. But the central banks' $300 billion was poured instead into the black hole of rescuing the very banks and hedge funds blamed for the "liquidity" crisis (the dried up well of investment money), encouraging loan sharks and speculators in their profligate ways.

Where did the central banks find the $300 billion? Central banks are "lenders of last resort." According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Economic Review, "to function as a lender of last resort [a central bank] must have authority to create money, i.e., provide unlimited liquidity on demand."1 In short, central banks can create money out of thin air. Increasing the money supply ("demand") without increasing goods and services ("supply") is highly inflationary; but this money-creating power is said to be necessary to correct the periodic market failures to which the banking system is inherently prone.2 "Busts" have followed "booms" so regularly and predictably in the last 300 years that the phenomenon has been dubbed the "business cycle," as if it were an immutable trait of free markets like the weather. But in fact it is an immutable trait only of a banking system based on the sleight of hand known as "fractional-reserve" lending. The banks themselves routinely create money out of thin air, and they need a lender of last resort to bail them out whenever they get caught short in this sleight of hand.

Running through this whole drama is a larger theme, one that nobody is talking about and that can't be cured by fiddling with interest rates or throwing liquidity at banks making too-risky loans. The reason the modern banking system is prone to periodic market failures is that it is a Ponzi scheme, one that is basically a fraud on the people. Like all Ponzi schemes, it can go on only so long before it reaches its mathematical limits; and there is good evidence that we are there now. If we are to avoid the greatest market crash in history, we must eliminate the underlying fraud; and to do that we need to understand what is really going on.

The 300 Year Ponzi Scheme Known as "Fractional-Reserve" Lending

A Ponzi scheme is a form of pyramid scheme in which earlier players are paid with the money of later players, until no more unwary investors are available to be sucked in at the bottom and the pyramid collapses, leaving the last investors holding the bag. Our economic Ponzi scheme dates back to Oliver Cromwell's "Glorious Revolution" in seventeenth century England. Before that, the power to issue money was the sovereign right of the King, and for anyone else to do it was considered treason. But Cromwell did not have access to this money-creating power. He had to borrow from foreign moneylenders to fund his revolt; and they agreed to lend only on condition that they be allowed back into England, from which they had been banned centuries earlier. In 1694, the Bank of England was chartered to a group of private moneylenders, who were allowed to print banknotes and lend them to the government at interest; and these private banknotes became the national money supply. They were ostensibly backed by gold; but under the fractional-reserve lending scheme, the amount of gold kept in "reserve" was only a fraction of the value of the notes actually printed and lent. This practice grew out of the discovery of the goldsmiths, that customers who left their gold for safekeeping would come for it only about 10 percent of the time. Ten paper banknotes "backed" by a pound of gold could therefore safely be printed and lent for every pound of gold the goldsmiths held in reserve. Nine of the notes were essentially counterfeits.

The Bank of England became the pattern for the system known today as "central banking." A single bank, usually privately owned, is given a monopoly over issuing the nation's currency, which is then lent to the government, usurping the government's sovereign power to create money itself. In the United States, formal adoption of this system dates to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913; but private banks have created the national money supply ever since the country was founded. Before 1913, multiple private banks issued banknotes with their own names on them; and as in England, the banks issued notes for much more gold than was in their vaults. The scheme worked until the customers got suspicious and all demanded their gold at once, when there would be a "run" on the banks and they would have to close their doors. The Federal Reserve (or "Fed") was instituted to rescue the banks from these crises by creating and lending money on demand. The banks themselves were already creating money out of nothing, but the Fed served as a backup source, generating the customer confidence necessary to carry on the fractional-reserve lending scheme.

Today, coins are the only money issued by the U.S. government, and they compose only about one one-thousandth of the money supply. Federal Reserve Notes (dollar bills) are issued by the privately-owned Federal Reserve and lent to the government and to commercial banks. Coins and Federal Reserve Notes together, however, compose less than 3 percent of the money supply. The rest is created by commercial banks as loans. The notion that virtually all of our money has been created by private banks is so foreign to what we have been taught that it can be difficult to grasp, but many reputable authorities have attested to it. (See E. Brown, "Dollar Deception: How Banks Secretly Create Money," www.webofdebt.com/articles, July 3, 2007.)

Among other problems with this system of money creation is that banks create the principal but not the interest necessary to pay back their loans; and that is where the Ponzi scheme comes in. Since loans from the Federal Reserve or commercial banks are the only source of new money in the economy, additional borrowers must continually be found to take out new loans to expand the money supply, in order to pay the interest creamed off by the bankers. New sources of debt are fanned into "bubbles" (rapidly rising asset prices), which expand until they "pop," when new bubbles are devised until no more borrowers can be found, and the pyramid finally collapses.

Before 1933, when the dollar went off the gold standard, the tether of gold served to limit the expansion of the money supply; but since then, the Fed's solution to collapsed bubbles has been to pump more newly-created money into the system. When the savings and loan associations collapsed, precipitating a recession in the 1980s, the Fed lowered interest rates and fanned the 1990s stock market bubble. When that bubble collapsed in 2000, the Fed dropped interest rates even further, creating the housing bubble of the current decade. When lenders ran out of "prime" borrowers, they turned to "subprime" borrowers - those who would not have qualified under the older, tougher standards. It was all part of the structural imperative of all Ponzi schemes, that the inflow of cash must continually expand to pay the people at the top. This expansion, however, has mathematical limits. In 2004, the Fed had to begin raising rates to tame inflation and to support the burgeoning federal debt by making government bonds more attractive to investors. The housing bubble was then punctured, and many subprime borrowers went into default.

The Subprime Mess and the Derivatives Scam

In the ever-growing need to find new borrowers, lending standards were relaxed. Adjustable rate mortgages, interest-only loans, no- or low-down-payment loans, and no-documentation loans made "home ownership" available to nearly anyone willing to take the bait. The risks of these loans were minimized by off-loading them onto unsuspecting investors. The loans were sliced up, bundled with less risky mortgages, and sold as mortgage-backed securities called "collateralized debt obligations" (CDOs). To induce rating agencies to give CDOs triple-A ratings, "derivatives" were thrown into the mix, ostensibly protecting investors from loss.

Derivatives are basically side bets that some investment (a stock, commodity, etc.) will go up or down in value. The simplest form is a "put" that pays the investor if an asset he owns goes down, neutralizing his risk. But most derivatives today are far more difficult to understand than that. Some critics say they are impossible to understand, because they were intentionally designed to mislead investors. By December 2006, according to the Bank for International Settlements, the derivatives trade had grown to $415 trillion. This is a Ponzi scheme on its face, since the sum is nearly nine times the size of the entire world economy. A thing is worth only what it will fetch in the market, and there is no market anywhere on the planet that can afford to pay up on these speculative bets.

The current market implosion began when investment bank Bear Stearns, which had been buying CDOs through its hedge funds, closed two of those funds in June 2007. When the creditors tried to get their money back, the CDOs were put up for sale, and there were no takers at anywhere near their stated valuations. Panic spread, as increasing numbers of investment banks had to prevent "runs" on their hedge funds by refusing withdrawals by investors concerned about fraudulent CDO valuations. When the problem became too big for the investment banks to handle, the central banks stepped in with their $300 billion lifeline.

Among those institutions rescued was Countrywide Financial, the largest U.S. mortgage lender. Countrywide has been called the next Enron, not only because it was facing bankruptcy but because it was guilty of some quite shady practices. It underwrote and sold hundreds of thousands of mortgages containing false and misleading information, which were then sold in the market as "securities." The lack of "liquidity" was blamed directly on these corrupt practices, which had frightened investors away from the markets. But that did not deter the Fed from sending in a lifeboat. Countrywide was saved when Bank of America bought $2 billion of its stock with a loan made available by the Fed at newly-reduced interest rates. Bank of America also got a nice windfall, since when investors learned that Countrywide was being rescued, the stock it just purchased shot up.

Where did the Fed itself get the money? Chris Powell of GATA (the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee) commented, "[I]n central banking, if you need money for anything, you just sit down and type some up and click it over to someone who is ready to do as you ask with it." He added:

If it works for the Federal Reserve, Bank of America, and Countrywide, it can work for everyone else. For it is no more difficult for the Fed to conjure $2 billion for Bank of America and its friends to "invest" in Countrywide than it would be for the Fed to wire a few thousand dollars into your checking account, calling it, say, an advance on your next tax cut or a mortgage interest rebate awarded to you because some big, bad lender encouraged you to buy a McMansion with no money down in the expectation that you could flip it in a few months for enough profit to buy a regular house.3

Which brings us to the point here: if somebody is going to be "reflating" the economy by typing up money on a computer screen, it should be Congress itself, the publicly accountable entity that alone is authorized to create money under the Constitution.

The Way Out

Economic collapse has been the predictable end of all Ponzi schemes ever since the Mississippi bubble of the eighteenth century. The only way out of this fix is to reverse the sleight of hand that got us into it. If new money must be pumped into the economy, it should be done, not by private banks for private profit, but by the people collectively through their representative government; and the money should be spent, not on bailing out banks and hedge funds that have lost speculative market gambles, but on socially productive services such as rebuilding infrastructure.

When deflation is tackled by creating new money in the form of debt to private banks, the result is a spiraling vortex of debt and price inflation. The better solution is to put debt-free money into consumers' pockets in the form of wages earned. Workers are increasingly losing their jobs to "outsourcing." A government exercising its sovereign right to issue money could pay those workers to build power plants using "clean" energy, high-speed trains, and other needed infrastructure. The government could then charge users a fee for these services, recycling the money from the government to the economy and back again, avoiding inflation.

Other considerations aside, we simply cannot afford the bank bailouts coming down the pike. If it takes $300 billion to avert a market collapse precipitated by a few failing hedge funds, what will the price tag be when the $400-plus trillion derivatives bubble collapses? Rather than bailing out banks that have usurped our sovereign right to create money, we the people should skip the middlemen and create our own money, debt- and interest-free. As William Jennings Bryan said in a historic speech a century ago:

[The bankers] tell us that the issue of paper money is a function of the bank and that the government ought to go out of the banking business. I stand with Jefferson . . . and tell them, as he did, that the issue of money is a function of the government and that the banks should go out of the governing business. . . . [W]hen we have restored the money of the Constitution, all other necessary reforms will be possible, and . . . until that is done there is no reform that can be accomplished.


The Sleight of Hand That Has Trapped Us in Debt and How We Can Break Free

04/21/2007 @ 08:57am

 
First, Henwood incorrectly refers to "elites" (plural), which is both wrong and distracting of corrective action by average, honest, working class people everywhere.

There is only one singular elite: the power-elite, the economic elite, the guileful global corporate elite Empire, which has hijacked the super-powered military of the US (to control global oil) and stolen the entire US government --- replacing it with the phony charade of this decades old "Vichy America".

Second, the global corporate elite Empire (like all Empires) is a predatory structure which depends entirely on the "Economics of Empire"; a global 'old economy' oily Ponzi scheme which builds and sustains a hierarchy of power and dominating wealth based on the well known market failure of negative externalitzation of costs upon society for its only source of faux-profits.

Third, the most compelling and revealing source that Henwood should have quoted to shed light on this economic Ponzi scheme of negative externalization, are the February reports of CitiGroup, Lehman, and UBS, in which they finally admit:

"The UBS and Lehman Brothers reports concur that climate change represents a classic market failure where company valuations neglect to take into account negative externalizations--in this case, predominantly the emission of carbon dioxide CO2, the primary greenhouse gas (GHG)."

"If climate change, one of the most studied environmental phenomena, represents a market failure, one can only wonder to what degree the legion of lesser-studied environmental and social externalities are not being priced into corporate valuations."

http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2237.html


Our economic strategy shouldn't come from Mr. Ponzi
Sept. 12, 2007 12:00 AM

For decades, Valley leaders have been saying the metro area needs a more diverse economy. For all the talk, housing construction accounts for at least $1 out of $3 generated in the area. Growth is still the major industry. We're growing because we're growing. The economy depends on a continual supply of people moving here, which sounds a lot more like a Ponzi scheme than a rational strategy for long-term prosperity.