What
are Credit Default
Swaps?
Unregulated
Insurance Policies for Risky, Toxic
Investments
Trading a protection
policy, designed by mathematicians and
physicists, purchased from a seller in order to protect the value of a
financial investment, is called a Credit Default Swap (CDS). It appears
to be an insurance policy purchased to protect the value of an asset;
however, a swap is not regulated insurance. Law professor and former
director of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission Dr. Michael
Greenberger, told 60 Minutes correspondent Steve
Kroft on October 5th 2008; "A credit default swap….is an
insurance contract, but they've been very careful not to call it that
because if it were insurance, it would be regulated. So they use a
magic substitute word called a 'swap'….”
Insurance regulations
require reserve capital to pay the
insured. Professor of Economics and Law, Dr. William K. Black, author
of the best selling book The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to
Own One; said during congressional testimony on October 14th
2008 that these derivatives were “casino
investing.” While “…hedging and futures
trading is an integral part of financial markets…swaps have
circumnavigated the regulators.”
On March 4th 2003, the BBC
reported that legendary investor
Warren Buffet said, “the derivatives market has
exploded…with these investments to…manage market
risk…” Buffet argued they
“…are time bombs and financial weapons
of mass destruction that could harm…the whole
economic system.”
History
New to investing, the first
swaps were sold in 1987 in the
form of Interest Rate (IR) and Cross Currency (CC) swaps. Credit
Default and Equity Swaps joined the Swap market in the first quarter of
2001 and 2002 respectively.
The total outstanding value
of all IR and CC swaps was $29
trillion by 1997. The first Credit Default Swaps totaled $631 billion
but by the first quarter of 2008 the 4 types of Swaps (IR, CC, Equity
and Credit Default) exploded to $531.2 trillion!
Problem
The data indicates that the
unregulated and under-capitalized
swap market, influenced by the housing
bubble, exasperated the CDS products throughout the financial
and banking system.
Alan Zibel, AP
business writer, reported
on September 5th 2008, “a record 9% of American homeowners
with a mortgage -- were either behind on their payments or in
foreclosure.” Syndicated writer Peter Miller wrote on 9/23 in
Realty Trac, “some 2.5 million homes
are…in the ‘process of
foreclosure’… the total value of such mortgages
would be $440 billion.”
The Bank for International
Settlements estimated the value of
these swaps as $45 trillion by the end of 2008. Christopher Cox,
Chairman of the SEC, testified before Congress on 9/23/08 that the
national CDS market was “$58 trillion.” However,
the International
Swaps
and Derivatives Association estimated the CDS value at $62.2
trillion at the end of 2007. Frank Partnoy, a derivatives broker and
law professor argued on 60 Minutes,
“It's sort of alarming that…we don't even know how
big [the CDS market] is to within, say, $10 trillion."
With a value of $45
– $62 trillion the swaps are 4
times the annual GDP of the United States (13.8 trillion in 2007.)
While it is agreed that the default value of these swaps is far below
their notional value, the default swap ratio to the default mortgage
value is still highly skewed.
Aline van Duyn wrote on
October 1st in the Financial
Times that in, “the credit derivatives
market…because of the opacity of this market, it is still
not clear how many contracts have to be settled….”
Shannon Harrington wrote in Bloomberg.com,
“Barclays' analysts estimated…that [if] $2
trillion in credit-default swaps…were to fail, it might
trigger $57 billion in losses.” This 2.9% ratio, extrapolated
over the total outstanding CDS would lead to $1.8 trillion write-off.
The direct CDS losses are 4 times higher than the total value of the
housing losses.
Dr. Greenberger put it
best, “…there is
much more…this is only the tip....” Original Article
Muffled Signals
The financial crisis has
put a spotlight on the obscure world of credit
default swaps - which trade in a vast,
unregulated market that
most people haven’t heard of and even
fewer understand. Will this be the next disaster?
In just over a decade
these privately traded derivatives contracts have
ballooned from nothing into a $54.6 trillion market. CDS are the
fastest-growing major type of financial derivatives. More important,
they’ve played a critical role in the unfolding financial
crisis.
First, by ostensibly providing “insurance” on risky
mortgage bonds, they encouraged and enabled reckless behavior during
the housing bubble.
“If CDS had
been taken out of play, companies
would’ve
said, ‘I can’t get this [risk] off my
books,’”
says Michael Greenberger, a University of Maryland law professor and
former director of trading and markets at the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. “If they couldn’t keep passing the risk
down
the line, those guys would’ve been stopped in their tracks.
The
ultimate assurance for issuing all this stuff was,
‘It’s
insured.’”
Second, terror at the
potential for a financial Ebola virus radiating
out from a failing institution and infecting dozens or hundreds of
other companies - all linked to one another by CDS and other
instruments - was a major reason that regulators stepped in to bail out
Bear Stearns and buy out AIG (AIG, Fortune 500), whose calamitous
descent itself was triggered by losses on its CDS contracts (see
“Hank’s Last Stand”).
“The big
problem is that here are all these public companies
-
banks and corporations - and no one really knows what exposure
they’ve got from the CDS contracts,” says Frank
Partnoy, a
law professor at the University of San Diego and former Morgan Stanley
derivatives salesman who has been writing about the dangers of CDS and
their ilk for a decade. “The really scary part is that we
don’t have a clue.” Chris Wolf, a co-manager of
Cogo Wolf,
a hedge fund of funds, compares them to one of the great mysteries of
astrophysics: “This has become essentially the dark matter of
the
financial universe.”
At
first glance, credit default swaps don’t look all that scary.
A CDS is just a
contract: The “buyer” plunks down something that
resembles a premium, and the “seller” agrees to
make a specific payment
if a particular event, such as a bond default, occurs. Used soberly,
CDS offer concrete benefits: If you’re holding bonds and
you’re worried that the issuer won’t be able to
pay, buying CDS should cover your loss. “CDS serve a very
useful function of allowing financial markets to efficiently transfer
credit risk,” argues Sunil Hirani, the CEO of Creditex, one
of a handful of marketplaces that trade
the contracts.
Because
they’re
contracts rather than securities or insurance, CDS are easy to create:
Often deals are done in a one-minute phone conversation or an instant
message. Many technical aspects of CDS, such as the typical five-year
term, have been standardized by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA). That only accelerates the process. You strike your
deal, fill out some forms, and you’ve got yourself a $5
million - or a $100 million - contract.
And
as long as someone is
willing to take the other side of the proposition, a CDS can cover just
about anything, making it the Wall Street equivalent of those notorious
Lloyds of London policies covering Liberace’s hands and other
esoterica. It has even become possible to purchase a CDS that would pay
out if the U.S. government defaults. (Trust us when we say that if the
government goes under, trying to collect will be the least of your
worries.)
You
can guess how Wall
Street cowboys responded to the opportunity to make deals that (1) can
be struck in a minute, (2) require little or no cash upfront, and (3)
can cover anything. Yee-haw! You can almost picture Slim Pickens in Dr.
Strangelove climbing onto the H-bomb before it’s released
from the B-52. And indeed, the volume of CDS has exploded with nuclear
force, nearly doubling every year since 2001 to reach a recent peak of
$62 trillion at the end of 2007, before receding to $54.6 trillion as
of June 30, according to ISDA.
Take
that gargantuan number
with a grain of salt. It refers to the face value of all outstanding
contracts. But many players in the market hold offsetting positions. So
if, in theory, every entity that owns CDS had to settle its contracts
tomorrow and “netted” all its positions against
each other, a much smaller amount of money would change hands. But even
a tiny fraction of that $54.6 trillion would still be a daunting sum.
The
credit freeze and then
the Bear disaster explain the drop in outstanding CDS contracts during
the first half of the year - and the market has only worsened since.
CDS contracts on widely held debt,
such as General Motors’ (GM, Fortune 500), continue to be
actively bought and sold. But traders say almost no new contracts are
being written on any but the most
liquid debt issues right now, in part because nobody wants to put money
at risk and because nobody knows what Washington will do and how that
will affect the market. (”There’s nothing to do but
watch Bernanke on TV,” one trader told Fortune during the
week when the Fed chairman was going before Congress to push the
mortgage bailout.) So, after nearly a decade of exponential growth, the
CDS market is poised for its first sustained contraction.
One reason the market took
off is that
you don’t have to own a bond to buy a CDS on it - anyone can
place a bet on whether a bond will fail. Indeed the majority of CDS now
consists of bets on other people’s debt. That’s why
it’s possible for the market to be so big: The $54.6 trillion
in
CDS contracts completely dwarfs total corporate debt, which the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association puts at $6.2
trillion, and the $10 trillion it counts in all forms of asset-backed
debt.
“It’s sort of like I think you’re a bad
driver and
you’re going to crash your car,” says Greenberger,
formerly
of the CFTC. “So I go to an insurance company and get
collision
insurance on your car because I think it’ll crash and
I’ll
collect on it.” That’s precisely what the biggest
winners
in the subprime debacle did. Hedge fund star John Paulson of Paulson
& Co., for example, made $15 billion in 2007, largely by using
CDS
to bet that other investors’ subprime mortgage bonds would
default.
So what started out as a vehicle for hedging ended up giving investors
a cheap, easy way to wager on almost any event in the credit markets.
In effect, credit default swaps became the world’s largest
casino. As Christopher Whalen, a managing director of Institutional
Risk Analytics, observes, “To be generous, you could call it
an
unregulated, uncapitalized insurance market. But really, you would call
it a gaming contract.”
There is at least one
key difference between casino gambling and CDS
trading: Gambling has strict government regulation. The federal
government has long shied away from any oversight of CDS. The CFTC
floated the idea of taking an oversight role in the late
’90s,
only to find itself opposed by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan
and others. Then, in 2000, Congress, with the support of Greenspan and
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, passed a bill prohibiting all
federal and most state regulation of CDS and other derivatives. In a
press release at the time, co-sponsor Senator Phil Gramm - most
recently in the news when he stepped down as John McCain’s
campaign co-chair this summer after calling people who talk about a
recession “whiners” - crowed that the new law
“protects financial institutions from over-regulation
…
and it guarantees that the United States will maintain its global
dominance of financial markets.” (The authors of the
legislation
were so bent on warding off regulation that they had the bill specify
that it would “supersede and preempt the application of any
state
or local law that prohibits gaming …”) Not
everyone was as
sanguine as Gramm. In 2003 Warren Buffett famously called derivatives
“financial weapons of mass destruction.”
There’s
another
big difference between trading CDS and casino gambling. When you put
$10 on black 22, you’re pretty sure the casino will pay off
if
you win. The CDS market offers no such assurance. One reason the market
grew so quickly was that hedge funds poured in, sensing easy money. And
not just big, well-established hedge funds but a lot of upstarts. So in
some cases, giant financial institutions were counting on collecting
money from institutions only slightly more solvent than your average
minimart. The danger, of course, is that if a hedge fund suddenly has
to pay off on a lot of CDS, it will simply go out of business.
“People have been insuring risks that they can’t
insure,” says Peter Schiff, the president of Euro Pacific
Capital
and author of Crash Proof, which predicted doom for Fannie and Freddie,
among other things. “Let’s say you’re
writing fire
insurance policies, and every time you get the [premium], you spend it.
You just assume that no houses are going to burn down. And all of a
sudden there’s a huge fire and they all burn down. What do
you
do? You just close up shop.”This is not an academic concern.
Wachovia (WB, Fortune 500) and Citigroup (C, Fortune 500) are wrangling
in court with a $50 million hedge fund located in the Channel Islands.
The reason: A dispute over two $10 million credit default swaps
covering some CDOs. The specifics of the spat aren’t
important.
What’s most revealing is that these massive banks put their
faith
in a Lilliputian fund (in an inaccessible jurisdiction) that was
risking 40% of its capital for just two CDS. Can anyone imagine that
Citi would, say, insure its headquarters building with a thinly
capitalized, unregulated, offshore entity?
That’s one element of what’s known as
“counterparty
risk.” Here’s another: In many cases, you
don’t even
know who has the other side of your bet. Parties to the contract can,
and do, transfer their side of the contract to third parties.
Investment firms assert that transfers are well documented (a claim
that, like most in the world of CDS, is impossible to verify). But even
if that’s true, you’re still left with the fact
that a
given company’s risks are being dispersed in ways that they
may
not know about and can’t control.
It doesn’t help that CDS trading is a haphazard process. Most
contracts are bought and sold over the phone or by instant message and
settled manually. Settlement has been sloppy, confirms Jamie Cawley of
IDX Capital, a firm that brokers trades between big banks. Pushed by
New York Fed president Timothy Geithner, the players have been
improving the process. But even as recently as a year ago, Cawley says,
so many trades were sitting around unfulfilled that “there
were
$1 trillion worth of swaps that were unsettled among
counterparties.”
Trade settlement is not the only anachronistic aspect of CDS trading.
Consider what will happen with CDS contracts relating to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The two were placed in conservatorship on Sept. 7. But the
value of many contracts won’t be determined till Oct. 6, when
an
auction will set a cash price for Fannie and Freddie bonds.
We’ll
spare you the technical reasons, but suffice it to ask: Can you imagine
any other major market that would need a month to resolve something
like this?
With Washington suddenly
in a frenzy of outrage over the financial
markets, debating everything from the shape and extent of the mortgage
plan to what should be done about short-selling, the future for CDS is
very blurry. “The market is here to stay,” asserts
Cawley.
The question is simply: What sorts of changes are in store? As this
article was going to press, SEC chairman Christopher Cox asked the
Senate to allow his agency to begin regulating CDS - mostly, it should
be said, to rein in short-selling. And the SEC separately announced
that it was expanding its investigation of market manipulation, which
initially targeted the short-sellers, to CDS investors.
Under other
circumstances, Cox’s request might have been met
with
polite silence. But the convulsions over the mortgage bailout are so
dramatic that they are reminiscent of the moment, soon after the Enron
scandal, when Congress drafted the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. The
desire to blame short-sellers may actually result in powers for Cox
that, until very recently, he showed no signs of wanting. Should
legislators wade into this issue, the measures most widely seen as
necessary are straightforward: some form of centralized trading or
clearing and some form of capital or reserve requirements. Meanwhile,
New York State’s insurance commissioner, Eric Dinallo,
announced
new regulations that would essentially treat sellers of some (but not
all) CDS as insurance entities, thereby forcing them to set aside
reserves and otherwise follow state insurance law - requirements that
would probably drive many participants from the market. Whether CDS
players will find a way to challenge the rules remains to be seen.
(ISDA, the industry’s trade group, has already gone on record
in
opposition to Cox’s proposal.) If nothing else, the New York
law
may provide additional impetus for the feds to take action.
For now, the biggest
impact could come from the Financial Accounting
Standards Board. It is implementing a new rule in November that will
require sellers of CDS and other credit derivatives to report detailed
information, including their maximum payouts and reasons for entering
the contracts, as well as assets that might allow them to offset any
payouts. Anybody who has tried to parse CEO compensation in recent
years knows that more disclosure doesn’t guarantee clarity,
but
any increase in information in the CDS realm will be a benefit. Perhaps
that would limit the baleful effect of CDS on (must we consider it?)
the next disaster - or even help us prevent it.
Links:
SEC Files Credit Default Swaps Insider
Trading Case
Unregulated Credit Default Swaps
Led to Weakness
Credit Default Swaps: The Poison in the
Financial System
Modern Money Mechanics
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Saturday, September 08, 2007
The 300 Year Old Ponzi Scheme
Panic struck on Wall Street, as the Dow Jones Industrial Average
plunged a thousand points between July and August, and commentators
warned of a 1929-style crash. To prevent that dire result, the U.S.
Federal Reserve, along with the central banks of Europe, Canada,
Australia and Japan, extended a 315 billion dollar lifeline to troubled
banks and investment firms. The hemorrhage stopped, the markets turned
around, and investors breathed a sigh of relief. All was well again in
Stepfordville. Or was it? And if it was, at what cost? Three hundred
billion dollars is about a third of the total paid by U.S. taxpayers in
personal income taxes annually. A mere $188 billion would have been
enough to repair all of the 74,000 U.S. bridges known to be defective,
preventing another disaster like that in Minneapolis in July. But the
central banks' $300 billion was poured instead into the black hole of
rescuing the very banks and hedge funds blamed for the "liquidity"
crisis (the dried up well of investment money), encouraging loan sharks
and speculators in their profligate ways.
Where did the central banks find the $300 billion? Central banks are
"lenders of last resort." According to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta's Economic Review, "to function as a lender of last resort [a
central bank] must have authority to create money, i.e., provide
unlimited liquidity on demand."1 In short, central banks can create
money out of thin air. Increasing the money supply ("demand") without
increasing goods and services ("supply") is highly inflationary; but
this money-creating power is said to be necessary to correct the
periodic market failures to which the banking system is inherently
prone.2 "Busts" have followed "booms" so regularly and predictably in
the last 300 years that the phenomenon has been dubbed the "business
cycle," as if it were an immutable trait of free markets like the
weather. But in fact it is an immutable trait only of a banking system
based on the sleight of hand known as "fractional-reserve" lending. The
banks themselves routinely create money out of thin air, and they need
a lender of last resort to bail them out whenever they get caught short
in this sleight of hand.
Running through this whole drama is a larger theme, one that nobody is
talking about and that can't be cured by fiddling with interest rates
or throwing liquidity at banks making too-risky loans. The reason the
modern banking system is prone to periodic market failures is that it
is a Ponzi scheme, one that is basically a fraud on the people. Like
all Ponzi schemes, it can go on only so long before it reaches its
mathematical limits; and there is good evidence that we are there now.
If we are to avoid the greatest market crash in history, we must
eliminate the underlying fraud; and to do that we need to understand
what is really going on.
The 300 Year Ponzi Scheme Known as "Fractional-Reserve" Lending
A Ponzi scheme is a form of pyramid scheme in which earlier players are
paid with the money of later players, until no more unwary investors
are available to be sucked in at the bottom and the pyramid collapses,
leaving the last investors holding the bag. Our economic Ponzi scheme
dates back to Oliver Cromwell's "Glorious Revolution" in seventeenth
century England. Before that, the power to issue money was the
sovereign right of the King, and for anyone else to do it was
considered treason. But Cromwell did not have access to this
money-creating power. He had to borrow from foreign moneylenders to
fund his revolt; and they agreed to lend only on condition that they be
allowed back into England, from which they had been banned centuries
earlier. In 1694, the Bank of England was chartered to a group of
private moneylenders, who were allowed to print banknotes and lend them
to the government at interest; and these private banknotes became the
national money supply. They were ostensibly backed by gold; but under
the fractional-reserve lending scheme, the amount of gold kept in
"reserve" was only a fraction of the value of the notes actually
printed and lent. This practice grew out of the discovery of the
goldsmiths, that customers who left their gold for safekeeping would
come for it only about 10 percent of the time. Ten paper banknotes
"backed" by a pound of gold could therefore safely be printed and lent
for every pound of gold the goldsmiths held in reserve. Nine of the
notes were essentially counterfeits.
The Bank of England became the pattern for the system known today as
"central banking." A single bank, usually privately owned, is given a
monopoly over issuing the nation's currency, which is then lent to the
government, usurping the government's sovereign power to create money
itself. In the United States, formal adoption of this system dates to
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913; but private banks have created the
national money supply ever since the country was founded. Before 1913,
multiple private banks issued banknotes with their own names on them;
and as in England, the banks issued notes for much more gold than was
in their vaults. The scheme worked until the customers got suspicious
and all demanded their gold at once, when there would be a "run" on the
banks and they would have to close their doors. The Federal Reserve (or
"Fed") was instituted to rescue the banks from these crises by creating
and lending money on demand. The banks themselves were already creating
money out of nothing, but the Fed served as a backup source, generating
the customer confidence necessary to carry on the fractional-reserve
lending scheme.
Today, coins are the only money issued by the U.S. government, and they
compose only about one one-thousandth of the money supply. Federal
Reserve Notes (dollar bills) are issued by the privately-owned Federal
Reserve and lent to the government and to commercial banks. Coins and
Federal Reserve Notes together, however, compose less than 3 percent of
the money supply. The rest is created by commercial banks as loans. The
notion that virtually all of our money has been created by private
banks is so foreign to what we have been taught that it can be
difficult to grasp, but many reputable authorities have attested to it.
(See E. Brown, "Dollar Deception: How Banks Secretly Create Money,"
www.webofdebt.com/articles, July 3, 2007.)
Among other problems with this system of money creation is that banks
create the principal but not the interest necessary to pay back their
loans; and that is where the Ponzi scheme comes in. Since loans from
the Federal Reserve or commercial banks are the only source of new
money in the economy, additional borrowers must continually be found to
take out new loans to expand the money supply, in order to pay the
interest creamed off by the bankers. New sources of debt are fanned
into "bubbles" (rapidly rising asset prices), which expand until they
"pop," when new bubbles are devised until no more borrowers can be
found, and the pyramid finally collapses.
Before 1933, when the dollar went off the gold standard, the tether of
gold served to limit the expansion of the money supply; but since then,
the Fed's solution to collapsed bubbles has been to pump more
newly-created money into the system. When the savings and loan
associations collapsed, precipitating a recession in the 1980s, the Fed
lowered interest rates and fanned the 1990s stock market bubble. When
that bubble collapsed in 2000, the Fed dropped interest rates even
further, creating the housing bubble of the current decade. When
lenders ran out of "prime" borrowers, they turned to "subprime"
borrowers - those who would not have qualified under the older, tougher
standards. It was all part of the structural imperative of all Ponzi
schemes, that the inflow of cash must continually expand to pay the
people at the top. This expansion, however, has mathematical limits. In
2004, the Fed had to begin raising rates to tame inflation and to
support the burgeoning federal debt by making government bonds more
attractive to investors. The housing bubble was then punctured, and
many subprime borrowers went into default.
The Subprime Mess and the Derivatives Scam
In the ever-growing need to find new borrowers, lending standards were
relaxed. Adjustable rate mortgages, interest-only loans, no- or
low-down-payment loans, and no-documentation loans made "home
ownership" available to nearly anyone willing to take the bait. The
risks of these loans were minimized by off-loading them onto
unsuspecting investors. The loans were sliced up, bundled with less
risky mortgages, and sold as mortgage-backed securities called
"collateralized debt obligations" (CDOs). To induce rating agencies to
give CDOs triple-A ratings, "derivatives" were thrown into the mix,
ostensibly protecting investors from loss.
Derivatives are basically side bets that some investment (a stock,
commodity, etc.) will go up or down in value. The simplest form is a
"put" that pays the investor if an asset he owns goes down,
neutralizing his risk. But most derivatives today are far more
difficult to understand than that. Some critics say they are impossible
to understand, because they were intentionally designed to mislead
investors. By December 2006, according to the Bank for International
Settlements, the derivatives trade had grown to $415 trillion. This is
a Ponzi scheme on its face, since the sum is nearly nine times the size
of the entire world economy. A thing is worth only what it will fetch
in the market, and there is no market anywhere on the planet that can
afford to pay up on these speculative bets.
The current market implosion began when investment bank Bear Stearns,
which had been buying CDOs through its hedge funds, closed two of those
funds in June 2007. When the creditors tried to get their money back,
the CDOs were put up for sale, and there were no takers at anywhere
near their stated valuations. Panic spread, as increasing numbers of
investment banks had to prevent "runs" on their hedge funds by refusing
withdrawals by investors concerned about fraudulent CDO valuations.
When the problem became too big for the investment banks to handle, the
central banks stepped in with their $300 billion lifeline.
Among those institutions rescued was Countrywide Financial, the largest
U.S. mortgage lender. Countrywide has been called the next Enron, not
only because it was facing bankruptcy but because it was guilty of some
quite shady practices. It underwrote and sold hundreds of thousands of
mortgages containing false and misleading information, which were then
sold in the market as "securities." The lack of "liquidity" was blamed
directly on these corrupt practices, which had frightened investors
away from the markets. But that did not deter the Fed from sending in a
lifeboat. Countrywide was saved when Bank of America bought $2 billion
of its stock with a loan made available by the Fed at newly-reduced
interest rates. Bank of America also got a nice windfall, since when
investors learned that Countrywide was being rescued, the stock it just
purchased shot up.
Where did the Fed itself get the money? Chris Powell of GATA (the Gold
Anti-Trust Action Committee) commented, "[I]n central banking, if you
need money for anything, you just sit down and type some up and click
it over to someone who is ready to do as you ask with it." He added:
If it works for the Federal Reserve, Bank of America, and Countrywide,
it can work for everyone else. For it is no more difficult for the Fed
to conjure $2 billion for Bank of America and its friends to "invest"
in Countrywide than it would be for the Fed to wire a few thousand
dollars into your checking account, calling it, say, an advance on your
next tax cut or a mortgage interest rebate awarded to you because some
big, bad lender encouraged you to buy a McMansion with no money down in
the expectation that you could flip it in a few months for enough
profit to buy a regular house.3
Which brings us to the point here: if somebody is going to be
"reflating" the economy by typing up money on a computer screen, it
should be Congress itself, the publicly accountable entity that alone
is authorized to create money under the Constitution.
The Way Out
Economic collapse has been the predictable end of all Ponzi schemes
ever since the Mississippi bubble of the eighteenth century. The only
way out of this fix is to reverse the sleight of hand that got us into
it. If new money must be pumped into the economy, it should be done,
not by private banks for private profit, but by the people collectively
through their representative government; and the money should be spent,
not on bailing out banks and hedge funds that have lost speculative
market gambles, but on socially productive services such as rebuilding
infrastructure.
When deflation is tackled by creating new money in the form of debt to
private banks, the result is a spiraling vortex of debt and price
inflation. The better solution is to put debt-free money into
consumers' pockets in the form of wages earned. Workers are
increasingly losing their jobs to "outsourcing." A government
exercising its sovereign right to issue money could pay those workers
to build power plants using "clean" energy, high-speed trains, and
other needed infrastructure. The government could then charge users a
fee for these services, recycling the money from the government to the
economy and back again, avoiding inflation.
Other considerations aside, we simply cannot afford the bank bailouts
coming down the pike. If it takes $300 billion to avert a market
collapse precipitated by a few failing hedge funds, what will the price
tag be when the $400-plus trillion derivatives bubble collapses? Rather
than bailing out banks that have usurped our sovereign right to create
money, we the people should skip the middlemen and create our own
money, debt- and interest-free. As William Jennings Bryan said in a
historic speech a century ago:
[The bankers] tell us that the issue of paper money is a function of
the bank and that the government ought to go out of the banking
business. I stand with Jefferson . . . and tell them, as he did, that
the issue of money is a function of the government and that the banks
should go out of the governing business. . . . [W]hen we have restored
the money of the Constitution, all other necessary reforms will be
possible, and . . . until that is done there is no reform that can be
accomplished.
The Sleight of Hand That Has Trapped Us in Debt and How We Can Break
Free
04/21/2007 @ 08:57am
First, Henwood incorrectly refers to "elites" (plural), which is both
wrong and distracting of corrective action by average, honest, working
class people everywhere.
There is only one singular elite: the power-elite, the economic elite,
the guileful global corporate elite Empire, which has hijacked the
super-powered military of the US (to control global oil) and stolen the
entire US government --- replacing it with the phony charade of this
decades old "Vichy America".
Second, the global corporate elite Empire (like all Empires) is a
predatory structure which depends entirely on the "Economics of
Empire"; a global 'old economy' oily Ponzi scheme which builds and
sustains a hierarchy of power and dominating wealth based on the well
known market failure of negative externalitzation of costs upon society
for its only source of faux-profits.
Third, the most compelling and revealing source that Henwood should
have quoted to shed light on this economic Ponzi scheme of negative
externalization, are the February reports of CitiGroup, Lehman, and
UBS, in which they finally admit:
"The UBS and Lehman Brothers reports concur that climate change
represents a classic market failure where company valuations neglect to
take into account negative externalizations--in this case,
predominantly the emission of carbon dioxide CO2, the primary
greenhouse gas (GHG)."
"If climate change, one of the most studied environmental phenomena,
represents a market failure, one can only wonder to what degree the
legion of lesser-studied environmental and social externalities are not
being priced into corporate valuations."
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2237.html
Our economic strategy shouldn't come from Mr. Ponzi
Sept. 12, 2007 12:00 AM
For decades, Valley leaders have been saying the metro area needs a
more diverse economy. For all the talk, housing construction accounts
for at least $1 out of $3 generated in the area. Growth is still the
major industry. We're growing because we're growing. The economy
depends on a continual supply of people moving here, which sounds a lot
more like a Ponzi scheme than a rational strategy for long-term
prosperity.